FEATURES

2 Risk analysis on the importation of specified poultry products

4 Biosecurity Council policy statement on interdepartmental consultation

6 Risk analysis

UPDATE

7 Draft import health standards for consultation
   New import health standards issued
   DoC policy on unwanted organisms
   MAF seminar on the SPS agreement a success

DIRECTORY

8 International animal health regulations
   How to contact us
At the end of March MAF released for public consultation an analysis of the potential disease risks which would be posed by the importation of specified poultry products. The document covers chicken meat and chicken meat products, and Bernard Matthews Foods Limited (BMFL) turkey meat preparations from the United Kingdom.

This risk analysis concluded that there is a definite risk that some exotic diseases could be introduced into poultry flocks in this country through such trade unless appropriate safeguards were implemented. The safeguards proposed are considered to be the least trade-restrictive measures which will provide appropriate protection for poultry, native birds and humans in this country. Nevertheless, some may be difficult for some potential exporters to meet.

**Background**

The risk analysis on importation of chicken meat products was conducted following requests from several trading partners, including the United States, Australia, the European Union and Thailand. Interest has also been expressed by potential importers in New Zealand.

Included in the larger study was a specific risk analysis on boneless turkey meat preparations manufactured by BMFL in the UK. Recent scientific findings relating to the transmission of avian diseases in meat and meat products also prompted this review.

At present, MAF does not permit the importation of uncooked chicken or turkey meat products. This policy had been implemented because of concerns that such trade might introduce exotic diseases.

**Process**

The risk analysis examined in detail 24 exotic diseases of chickens and turkeys that might constitute a risk to local poultry, native birds, or humans. The analysis used established qualitative and, where appropriate, quantitative techniques, just as was done when the disease risks posed by importation of salmon were analysed.

The analysis was subject to close scientific review, in whole or in part, by 16 experts in New Zealand and overseas. The reviewers included poultry specialists, virologists, epidemiologists and professional risk analysts, many of whom are regarded as world experts in their field.

The risk analysis has now been released for industry and public comment. MAF has briefed the Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand, potential exporting countries, and other government departments with biosecurity responsibilities. The document is open until 15 June for public comment by interested parties both within New Zealand and overseas.

MAF will review all submissions received, and prepare a summary of submissions and a new executive summary for the risk analysis. This may take several months, depending on the number and nature of submissions received.

If this further consideration indicates that new trading conditions can be developed, or existing trading conditions need to be modified, MAF will begin negotiating conditions with other countries. At the end of this process any new import health standards will be open for public comment, both within New Zealand and internationally, for at least 60 days.

**Chicken meat and chicken meat products**

The range of chicken meat products covered by the analysis included: uncooked and cooked carcasses; bone-in cuts such as legs; wings and drumsticks, and boneless cuts; and chicken meat products.

The analysis of the disease risks posed by importations of chicken meat products examined the epidemiology and physical characteristics of some 24 pathogens considered to be of importance to avian or human health in New Zealand.

A careful study of the literature, and consultation with experts, demonstrated that while it is theoretically possible for some disease agents to be present in chicken meat products, in reality there are relatively few for which specific import safeguards are required.

For some diseases, the risks from imported chicken meat products are no greater than those from locally-manufactured chicken products. It is not the policy of the New Zealand government to impose on imports sanitary measures which are more stringent than those applying to locally-produced products.

For all chicken meat products, significant risks were considered to be associated with certain serotypes of Salmonella and with paramyxovirus 1.
Bernard Matthews Foods Limited turkey meat preparations from the United Kingdom

Turkeys are susceptible to most of the diseases affecting chickens, so the same importation recommendations apply for most diseases affecting both species. However, there are some diseases which affect turkeys exclusively and detailed consideration was given to these.

As for chicken meat, IBD virus was identified as the main hazard of concern in the BMFL turkey meat preparations. In contrast to the situation with chicken meat products, the analysis determined that IBD serotype 1 (IBD1) poses a negligible risk in these specific turkey meat preparations. IBD1 has never been found in turkeys in the United Kingdom, and BM FL turkeys have been monitored specifically for this infection.

Although BM FL turkeys are free from IBD1, another strain of the virus, IBD serotype 2 (IBD2) is very common in turkey flocks in the UK. However, the same quantitative risk assessment method which demonstrated a very high risk for IBD1 in chicken meat showed that the risk of introducing IBD2 virus in BM FL turkey meat preparations from the UK is low (fewer than two introductions per 100 years of trade).

Furthermore, IBD2 differs from IBD1 in that it does not cause disease in any bird species, wild or domesticated. Nevertheless, the Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand has argued that the presence of IBD2 in New Zealand would interfere with this industry’s attempts to test for the presence of IBD1.

Whether or not this is true is uncertain, but two of the three world reference laboratories for IBD state that the presence IBD2 should not interfere with testing for IBD1. The third reference laboratory states that a modified testing method would need to be introduced to be able to distinguish infections due to IBD1 and IBD2.

MAF considers that as the risk of introducing IBD2 in BM FL turkey meat preparations from the United Kingdom is low, and as the consequences of introduction are minor (no disease, possible interference with testing for IBD1), importation should be permitted without the imposition of specific safeguards for IBD2.

The overall recommendation of this risk analysis is that BM FL turkey meat preparations from the United Kingdom should be permitted entry to New Zealand provided that they comply with specific safeguards against various salmonellae, avian influenza, Newcastle disease and certain other paramyxoviruses, and turkey viral hepatitis. The safeguards proposed for BM FL turkey meat preparations are also detailed in the risk analysis.


Stuart MacDiarmid, National Manager (Agricultural Security), phone 04 474 4223, macdiarmaids@maf.govt.nz

The deadline for submissions is 15 June 1999.
The Biosecurity Council has adopted a policy on how departments will consult with each other when developing risk analyses and import health standards.

This policy was developed to strengthen, and state publicly, the way that departments with operational responsibilities for biosecurity will cooperate when they are considering risks which might affect the responsibilities of other departments.

The Biosecurity Act does put legal obligations on departments to consult with other departments whose responsibilities might be affected, when they are issuing import health standards (IHSs) or preparing risk analyses which might lead to IHSs being issued. But this policy goes beyond these legal obligations to establish a workable way of cooperating.

When a department undertakes a risk analysis or proposes to issue or amend an IHS, it will establish a project team to plan and oversee the work. Other departments whose biosecurity responsibilities might be affected will be invited to participate in the project team, and can take part either just when the scope of the project is being determined or as a permanent member of the team.

Similarly, departments with a legitimate interest in the risk analysis or IHS might be represented on the working group which actually carries out the risk analysis or prepares the IHS.

Affected departments will be able to comment on a draft risk analysis or IHS before it is released for public consultation. They will also be able to comment on the proposed risk-management measures before the working group finalises any IHS.

There are some exceptions to this process for minor amendments and emergency measures.

The departments with operational responsibility for biosecurity are the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Department of Conservation, Ministry of Fisheries and Ministry of Health.

Andrew Matheson, National Adviser SPS (Animals), phone 04 474 4219, mathesona@maf.govt.nz
The consultation may be on the import health standard or on a document that analyses or assesses the risks associated with the goods or class of goods to which the goods belong.

2 Context

2.1 The four biosecurity departments have statutory responsibility to make decisions on the importation of risk goods; which may, among other things, pose risks to human, animal or plant health. Under section 22(1) of the Biosecurity Act 1993 their chief technical officers (CTOs) make recommendations to the Director-General (DG) of MAF for import health standards (IHSs), which specify the requirements for the effective management of risks associated with the importation of risk goods, to be issued, amended or revoked. The DG’s authority to issue IHSs is delegated to MAF CTOs, and the authority of MAF CTOs to make recommendations is delegated to MAF technical staff.

2.2 The operational responsibilities of a department might be affected by the risks to be addressed by an IHS developed by another department, or by the measures imposed by that standard.

2.3 The consultative process set out in section 3 of this document will enable departments to communicate any concerns regarding risk analyses and IHSs at an early stage so these concerns can be addressed. Where departments are unable to agree on how biosecurity risks are best managed, technical staff should refer unresolved issues to their respective CTOs who may in turn refer issues to the Biosecurity Council.

2.4 Departments may, after participation in this process, still wish to make submissions during public consultation on risk analyses and proposed IHSs. It is the expectation of the Biosecurity Council that departmental submissions should, apart from being based on sound technical expertise, reflect a reasonable knowledge of the legal and policy framework of the Biosecurity Act and of relevant international obligations.

2.5 Because the revocation of IHSs stops trade and would not normally adversely affect the biosecurity responsibilities of another department, notification (rather than consultation) is all that is required by the process outlined in section 4.

3 Process relating to risk analyses and the issuing or amending of IHSs

3.1 A department undertaking a risk analysis or proposing to issue or amend IHSs (the ‘lead department’) will invite input from departments whose biosecurity responsibilities might be affected, before it begins such a task. The exception to this commitment is where a standard is required urgently or where any amendment is minor.

3.2 This invitation will take the form of an invitation to participate in a ‘project team’, which will determine the scope of the risk analysis or IHS and outline a plan for its completion. Participation in the project team requires appropriate technical expertise, and a reasonable knowledge of the legal and policy framework of the Biosecurity Act and relevant international obligations. When invited by a lead department to nominate staff to take part in a project team, all relevant departments are expected to respond by the deadline given.

3.3 The risk analysis or IHS will usually be developed by a ‘working group’ in the lead department, but in some cases this work might be contracted by the lead department to an external contractor and reviewed by a working group. Other biosecurity departments might take part in the working group if the potential impact on their responsibilities is sufficient.

3.4 Affected departments, directly or through their representative on the project team, will be given the opportunity to consider the draft risk analysis or IHS before it is released for public consultation.

3.5 The working group will analyse all public submissions and report accordingly to the project team.

3.6 Affected departments, directly or through their representative on the project team, will be given the opportunity to again consider proposed sanitary or phytosanitary (risk-mitigation) measures before the working group finalises the risk analysis or IHS.

3.7 Separate IHSs based on a risk analysis which has undergone this process will not be further consulted on in this way, but can be issued by the lead department subject only to the notification process set out in sections 3.8 and 3.9 below. Where an existing IHS allows for dispensations or equivalence (deviations from the exact conditions of an IHS which provide no less health guarantee), they may be granted by a CTO, either for specific consignments or in general, without further consultation or notification.

3.8 The relevant CTO in the lead department will propose that the IHS be issued, and advise the chief executive of all other biosecurity departments (attention: CTO or their nominee) accordingly at least five working days before the IHS is issued. (A copy of the draft IHS will be sent at that time).

3.9 The CTO (or MAF Director-General) may then issue the IHS.

4 Process regarding the revocation of IHSs

4.1 The relevant CTO in the department which issued the IHS will propose that the IHS be revoked, and advise the chief executive of all other biosecurity departments (attention: CTO or their nominee) accordingly at least five working days before the IHS is revoked. (A copy of the IHS to be revoked will be sent at that time).

4.2 The CTO (or MAF Director-General) may then revoke the IHS.

for John Hellström
Chair, Biosecurity Council
17 December 1998
Risk analysis is a well-known phrase that is often bandied about. But behind the cliché is a science-based discipline that provides a practical framework for assessing the likelihood of the introduction or establishment of pests and diseases.

Risk analysis is the process on which the Animal Health and Welfare group bases its decisions regarding the importation of animals and animal products to New Zealand. It is also used by the controlling veterinary authorities of our overseas trading partners, both in setting their import standards for New Zealand exports, and in assessing the validity of New Zealand’s import decisions.

The development of risk analysis has been fostered by advances in surveillance and monitoring techniques, quality assurance measures and computer-based diagnostic tools. Because decisions are well informed, transparent and neutral, risk analysis is a widely accepted method of identifying and assessing risk. Most importantly, decisions based on risk analysis are scientifically justifiable. This has huge implications for New Zealand’s exporters.

Risk analysis involves:

**Hazard identification**

The hazard is identified.
- What might potentially cause harm?
- What can go wrong?

**Risk assessment**

Risk is a function of the probability of the hazard occurring and the consequence of it occurring.
- How likely is it that a particular hazard will occur?
- How serious would the consequences be?

That is, risk assessment examines how likely a proposed importation is to result in the introduction and establishment of a disease, and:
- what the costs would be of controlling and eradicating that disease;
- whether it would affect access to international markets.

**Risk management**

Possible measures to reduce the amount of risk are identified. The goal is to minimise the risk as far as practicable. ‘Zero risk’ or ‘no risk’ is universally accepted as being both unattainable and unworkable.

Examples of risk management measures are:
- testing and/or inspection to ensure that the product is free from disease-causing microorganisms;
- treatment to kill unwanted microorganisms;
- quality assurance measures such as HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control points) systems.

**Risk communication**

Risk communication is a two-way process in which the concerns of potentially affected parties are listened to and addressed, and the risk analysis process is explained to them. It is important to explain the risk analysis process clearly so that stakeholders understand:
- the process that will be followed;
- what the risks are and what they mean;
- what the risk mitigation process will involve.

The Animal Health and Welfare group carries out risk analyses to protect New Zealand’s animal health status and enable market access for this country’s exports. Making import decisions on the basis of risk analysis means that our biosecurity measures applied to trade can be seen to be well informed, transparent and based on sound scientific evidence.

In terms of market access, the signing of the SPS agreement (the WTO ‘Agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures’) focused international import decision-making on technically defensible standards. If we expect our trading partners’ import decisions to be justified by hard scientific evidence, such as that presented by risk analysis, ours must be too.

Animal Health and Welfare is presently undertaking a major project to develop a methodology for undertaking risk analyses, so that the results are backed up by good science. This methodology will be used by the group to develop technically-sound import health standards, surveillance programmes and exotic disease response programmes.

Stuart MacDiarmid, National Manager (Agricultural Security), phone 04 474 4223, macdiarmids@maf.govt.nz
**Draft import health standards for consultation**

The following draft import health standards (IHSs) have been developed by MAF and are available for public consultation.

**White rhinoceroses from the Republic of South Africa into zoological gardens**

MAF has received applications from various zoological gardens in New Zealand, to import white rhinoceroses. Following consultation, this standard is expected to be available for use after 15 June 1999.

**Flamingoes into zoological gardens**

Following the completion of the risk analysis notified in Biosecurity 6:14, an IHS has been prepared. MAF has received applications to import from various zoological gardens in New Zealand. Following consultation, this standard is expected to be available for use after 15 June 1999.

**New import health standards issued**

The following new import health standards (IHSs) have been issued by the Chief Veterinary Officer and are available for use. Any previous IHSs covering these combinations of country of origin and commodity/species have been revoked.

**Organic-based fertiliser from the United States of America**

The risk analysis this standard is based on was notified for public consultation in Biosecurity 8:9. This standard allows for the importation of fertilisers utilising bovine blood, bovine bone meal, poultry hydrolysates and fish hydrolysates of marine origin only.

**Rabbit hair from all countries**

This document has been amended to bring the standard in line with new terminology for transitional facilities and biosecurity direction in the revised Biosecurity Act.

**Ornamental animal products from all countries**

This standard was modified to include the definitions of ‘freshwater fish’ and ‘marine fish’, as well as ‘mounted fish and ornaments’ and ‘marine fish and shell ornaments’.

**Specific pathogen free (SPF) chicken (Gallus gallus) eggs from approved countries**

The title of this import health standard has been altered to allow countries other than Australia to be added in the future.

**Bovine semen from Jersey**

This standard was notified for public consultation in Biosecurity 6:15. An assessment by MAF of the proposed importation found there to be no demonstrable disease risk with cattle semen from Jersey.

**Anseriforme (duck, goose, swan or Muscovy ducks) hatching eggs from Canada**

This standard was notified for public consultation in Biosecurity 9:5. The import requirements and technical issues have been reviewed in conjunction with industry and experts.

**Live pigs from New Caledonia**

This standard was notified for public consultation in Biosecurity 8:8. MAF Regulatory Authority has responded to a market access from New Caledonia for live pigs, as the pig industry wishes to export pigs for the agricultural field days.

---

**Department of Conservation policy on unwanted organisms**

The Department of Conservation (DoC) has issued its policy statement on determination of unwanted organisms under the Biosecurity Act.

The Biosecurity Council approved its policy statement on unwanted organisms in September 1998 (see Biosecurity 7: 8-9). That policy statement clarified the responsibilities of relevant organisations and chief technical officers (CTOs), and aimed to ensure consistency in both the determination of organisms to be unwanted and the development of policy statements by departments.

The Biosecurity Council policy statement said that each department with responsibilities for biosecurity (MAF, DoC, Fisheries, Health) would develop and maintain its own policy statement setting out the criteria by which its CTO determines (or CTOs determine) an organism to be an unwanted organism.

The policy statement from DoC is the first such statement to be issued since the Biosecurity Council policy came into effect. MAF’s policy statement on unwanted organisms had previously been developed, and had been updated from time to time (Biosecurity 1: 6-7 and 6: 4-5).

The DoC policy statement follows the format and content of the MAF policy statement, allows for organisms to be determined to be unwanted if they pose a serious risk to indigenous flora or fauna, or the introduced species for which DoC is responsible.

Geoff Hicks, Chief Technical Officer (Biosecurity Conservation), Department of Conservation, PO Box 10 420, Wellington, phone 04 471 3063, fax 04 471 3279, ghicks@doc.govt.nz
These animal health regulations have been either proposed or implemented by members of the World Trade Organization, and have been notified under the SPS agreement (the WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures) between 30 January and 9 April 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Date notified</th>
<th>Summary of content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17/3/99</td>
<td>Destruction of waste and remains generated from storage and transport of animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3/3/99</td>
<td>Temporary importation of horses serologically positive for piroplasmosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3/3/99</td>
<td>Horses serologically positive for piroplasmosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17/3/99</td>
<td>Rhinoceros from South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9/4/99</td>
<td>Frozen/chilled beef from Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8/3/99</td>
<td>Live bovines and bovine, caprine, ovine products and by-products to prevent introduction of BSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3/3/99</td>
<td>Amendment of resolution relating to live bovines and bovine, caprine, ovine products and by-products to prevent introduction of BSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5/3/99</td>
<td>Products of animal origin from Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31/3/99</td>
<td>Meat and animal products containing chemical growth stimulators and feed antibiotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>23/3/99</td>
<td>Disease status of South Africa with respect to foot and mouth disease and rinderpest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>2/3/99</td>
<td>Pork and pork products from Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>31/3/99</td>
<td>Packaging and labeling of veterinary biological products</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAF seminar on the SPS agreement a success

A well-attended seminar recently grappled with the opportunities, threats and challenges of the SPS agreement.

The Animal Health & Welfare group of MAF Regulatory Authority organised the seminar, which was entitled ‘The SPS agreement; have new trading rules delivered the goods?’ The audience comprised key industry leaders, representatives of government departments and NGOs, and other interested people.

Opened by the Minister for International Trade, the seminar featured three international speakers and three further New Zealand speakers:

Keynote address
The New Zealand Minister for International Trade, Hon Dr Lockwood Smith

Four years of the SPS agreement; what have we learned, what is next?
Dr Alex Thiermann, Chairman of the World Trade Organization’s SPS committee (based in Geneva), and Senior Trade Coordinator, APHIS International Services (US Department of Agriculture), Brussels, Belgium

How New Zealand primary industries have benefited from the SPS agreement
Malcolm Bailey, President, Federated Farmers of New Zealand

The new trading rules; major challenges for a domestic industry
Brian Milne, Chief Executive, New Zealand Pork Industry Board

Perspectives on the SPS agreement
Dr J an Arnoldi, Associate Administrator, APHIS, US Department of Agriculture, Washington DC

The new role of the OIE in international trade
Dr Norman Willis, President of the international committee of the world organisation for animal health (the OIE), and Executive Director, National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Winnipeg, Manitoba

Fragile ecosystems facing threat?
Dr Oliver Sutherland, Science Manager Biosecurity and Pest Management, Landcare Research, Lincoln

The seminar was well attended and received favourable comment. The talks are now on MAF’s web site.

Andrew Matheson, National Adviser SPS (Animals), phone 04 474 4219, matheson@maf.govt.nz, http://www.maf.govt.nz/SPS/seminar/seminar.htm